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In the absence of governmental checks and balances present in other
areas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon executive
policy and power in the areas of national defense and international
affairs may lie in an enlightened citizenry-in an informed and
critical public opinion which alone can here protect the values of
democratic government.'
-Justice Potter Stewart

In October 2008, the author moderated a panel discussion addressing the
utility of establishing a new national security court system for administering the
detention and trial of terrorist suspects. The discussion featured comments by
five lawyers with significant research and practical experience in the field.
Richard Zabel is a partner and co-chair of the Litigation Group at Akin Gump
Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP. Mr. Zabel served previously as an Assistant U.S.
Attorney and is co-author of In Pursuit of Justice: Prosecuting Terrorism
Cases in the FederalCourts.2 Glenn L. Sulmasy is an Associate Professor of
Law at the United States Coast Guard Academy and author of the forthcoming
book, The NationalSecurity Court System: A NaturalEvolution of Justice in
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I.
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Accord STEPHEN DYCuS, ARTHUR L. BERNEY, WILLIAM C. BANKS & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, NATIONAL
SECURITY LAw 3 (4th ed. 2007) (citing Id. and observing that the "failure of courts to give authoritative
answers to many questions of national security law suggests to some that public opinion is what ultimately
counts in this field").
2.
See RICHARD B. ZABEL & JAMES J. BENJAMIN, JR., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, INPURSUIT OF
JUSTICE:
PROSECUTING TERRORISM CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS (2008), available at
http://www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/080521 -USLS-pursuit-justice.pdf (last visited Feb. 5, 2009).
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an Age of Terror.3 Hina Shamsi is a Staff Attorney in the American Civil
Liberties Union's National Security Project and author of various works on
torture and "extraordinary rendition." Gabor Rona serves as International Legal
Director at Human Rights First and has written extensively on the application
of international human rights and humanitarian law to terrorism.4 Matthew C.
Waxman served as the first Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee
Affairs and is now an Associate Professor at Columbia Law School and author
of Detention As Targeting: Standardsof Certaintyand Detentionof Suspected
Terrorists.5 The panel discussion was frank and wide-ranging; it contributed
to the objective of ensuring an "informed and critical public opinion" the likes
of which Justice Potter Stewart endorsed in his New York Times concurrence
quoted above. 6 Completed in the closing hours of the Bush Administration, the
following article presents some of the salient points from that discussion. It
reflects the perspectives of its author and not necessarily those of the panelists.
I. A FEARFUL NEW WORLD?
During the years since the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United
States has grappled publicly with questions about how to detain, interrogate,
and try those accused of plotting to harm national security. More than other
episodes in recent American history, the rise of a transnational threat from
violent Islamists has raised a series of interrelated policy issues that define a
generation's understanding of the meaning of its republic. Some of the issues
resurrect long-standing constitutional debates such as the substance of
presidential emergency powers, the proper separation of war powers between
Congress and the Executive, and the appropriate roles ofthejudiciary in adjudicating these disputes and in regulating foreign policy. These constitutional
questions have been subjected to lively debate since the beginning of the
republic. Other issues arise mostly due to the transformational effects of
globalization. Al Qaeda's reach is global-as are the interests, assets, and
vulnerabilities of the United States. Likewise, global supply chains, jet-age
3.

GLENN L. SULMASY, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COURT SYSTEM: A NATURAL EVOLUTION OF

JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF TERROR (forthcoming 2009) [hereinafter Sulmasy 2009]. See also Glenn Sulmasy,

This Way to Exit Gitmo, NAT'L REV. ONLINE (,RO), July 6, 2006, available at http://article.nationalreview.
=
(last visited Feb. 7, 2009).
com/?q=YzU5YjZIZWZhOWRhNWE1MzI4ZjQzYTAxOGQ4MzczZWY
See Gabor Rona, A Bull in the China Shop: The 'War on Terror'andInternationalLaw in the
4.
United States, 39 CAL. W. INT. L. J. 101 (2008); Gabor Rona, An Appraisal of US. PracticeRelating to
'Enemy Combatants', 10 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L., 232-50 (2008); Gabor Rona, Enemy Combatants
in the 'War on Terror': A Case Study of how Myopic Lawyering Makes Bad Law, 30, No. 1, ABA NAT'L
SEC. L. REP. (2008).
5.
Matthew C. Waxman, Detention as Targeting: Standards of Certainty and Detention of
Suspected Terrorists, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1365 (2008).
6.

New York Times Co., 403 U.S. 713.
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travel systems, the World-Wide Web, and universal human rights treaties
collectively weave a global community in which the effects of perturbations are
wide-spread and magnified. Many of these issues arise because the United
States is confronting a large-scale, non-state threat that extends to the homeland
and does so in an age in which individual rights and responsibilities are much
more fully articulated than they had been in previous generations. The United
States has confronted other large, non-state threats to domestic security before,
most notably during the post-Reconstruction Era when white supremacists
sought to undo the political outcome of the Civil War.7 But the emergence over
the past sixty years of relatively robust norms and law protecting civil, political,
and human rights has reshaped the power of states over individuals. Now these
newly articulated rights are constantly being weighed against concerns for
national security Globalization is rapidly transforming the norms and the
means of national security and lawyers within the government and without have
been working hard to ensure that the rule of law continues to play a relevant
and constructive role as the environment in which it is situated undergoes
revolutionary changes. Unsurprisingly, the cutting edge of this transformation
is at the place where a state's interest in survival abuts that of an individual.
The putative tension between national security and individual rights
emerges in several areas but nowhere as dramatically as in the detention and
trial of accused terrorists.9 Since 2001, the United States has detained
individuals in jails, ° prisons, 1' and military brigs in the United States, 12 in

7.

See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877 (Ann

Finlayson ed., 1988) (1984); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (2d rev. ed., 1966);
STANLEY KANTROWITZ & BEN TILLMAN, THE RECONSTRUCTION OF WHITE SUPREMACY (2000).

8.
Another important area where national security confronts individual rights that has not received
as much attention is in military targeting. What due process is owed to suspected al Qaeda members in the
Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan when U.S. forces target and attack them?
9.
See Jeremy Waldron, Safety and Security, 85 NEB. L. REv. 454 (2006) (analyzing the
definitions of security implied by a liberty/security balance to enlighten any discussion of tradeoffs); Irwin
Cotler, Terrorism, Security and Rights: The Dilemmaof Democracies, 14 NAT'L J. CONST. L. 13, 13 (2002)

(rejecting the zero sum analysis of national security versus civil liberties); William W. Burke-White, Human
Rights andNationalSecurity: The StrategicCorrelation, 17 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 249, 249 (2004) (arguing

that "subordination of human rights to national security is both unnecessary and strategically questionable").
10.

HUMAN

RIGHTS

FIRST,

ENDING

SECRET

DETENTIONS

13

(2004),

available at

http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/PDF/EndingSecretDetentions-web.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2009)
(documenting the widespread detentions).

11.

See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Discusses Creation of Military

Tribunals to Try Suspected Terrorists (Sept. 6, 2006), availableat http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.

gov/news/releases/2006/09/print/20060906-3.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2009) [hereinafter President Bush
Speech].
12.
(2004).

See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 596 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 432
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secret "black sites" abroad, in various facilities in Iraq 3 and Afghanistan, 4 and
a special purpose facility at the U.S. naval base in Guantinamo Bay, Cuba. 5
The government has also utilized a system of renditions and "extraordinary
renditions" to detain and interrogate terrorist suspects in facilities operated by
other states. 6 The government has also sponsored trials in immigration 7 and
district courts and an evolving system of military tribunals. 8 This patchwork
of detention and trial has been shaped by many factors, some express and others
that lay unstated. Sometimes existing facilities, such as immigration courts
proved reasonably convenient. In other circumstances, the Bush Administration
found reasons to craft new institutions, sometimes with the support of
Congress. 19 Because people's lives and liberty are at stake, these policies and
practices have been highly contentious.

I. THE CURRENTS RUNNiNG BELOW GUANTANAMO
For seven years, opinions have varied widely about how to characterize the
contemporary security environment; this lack of consensus has led to bitter
disagreements about policy. In this way, 9/11 differs dramatically from the
1941 attack on Pearl Harbor. On December 8, 1941, every American agreed
that the United States was at war with Japan and many policy prescriptions
flowed axiomatically from that observation. In contrast, the current situation
has failed to produce a clear consensus, leaving people to hold highly divergent
opinions about the policies that should be implemented. These opinions reflect
different views of reality, not just empirical facts, but also more essential
characterizations about the dynamics of interactions among humans and among
states. The following section identifies seven such disagreements that help
explain the legal and policy debates surrounding post-9/1 1 detention,
13.
See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l, Iraq: Beyond Abu Ghraib: Detention and Torture in Iraq, Mar. 2006,
available at http://www.amnesty.orgen/library/asset/MDE14/001/2006/en/dom-MDE140012006en.html (last
visited Feb. 7,2009); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE NEW IRAQ? TORTURE AND ILL-TREATMENT OF DETAINEES
INIRAQI CUSTODY 2 (Jan. 2005), availableat http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/fi les/reports/iraqO 105 .pdf(last
visited Feb. 7, 2009).
14.
See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ENDURING FREEDOM 3 (Mar. 2004), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/afghanistan03O4.pdf (last visited Feb. 7, 2009).
15.
Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Status of Detainees at Guanthnamo (Feb. 7, 2002),
available at http://www.us-mission.ch/press2002/0802fleischerdetainees.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
16.
See Torture By Proxy: International And Domestic Law Applicable To "Extraordinary
Renditions," in THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE CONSEQUENCE OF 9/I 1 (Silkenat & Shulman eds., 2007).
17.
See William Glaberson, A Nation Challenged: The Law; US. Asks to Use Secret EvidenceIn
Many Cases Of Deportation,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2001, at IB (noting the use of immigration courts).
18.

See President Bush Speech, supra note 11 (describing post-9/l 1 military tribunals).

19.
See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001-06, 119 Stat. 2742 (2005);
Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-336, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006).
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interrogation, and trial policies. Each illustrates the acute juxtaposition a
government faces in meeting transnational and serious threats in the "Age of
Rights.,, 2' Already alluded to, the first goes directly to the overall characterization of the situation: that the United States is and ought rightly to be engaged
in a "Global War on Terrorism." The second reflects long-standing national
security concerns: that intelligence sources and methods must by all means be
protected in order to ensure their continued utility for promoting security. The
third is relatively new and hotly contested: some people must be tortured or
otherwise subjected to "enhanced interrogation techniques" and then tried. The
fourth is less often discussed but of growing legal significance: some detainees
are actually dangerous, but not to the United States or its allies. Fifth, there
might be certain people in captivity who intend to harm U.S. interests but have
not entered into a criminal conspiracy or committed an act for which a criminal
court could convict them. Sixth, distrust of the Executive or the Bush
Administration itself became increasingly evident and material in shaping
policy. The seventh, and final, cluster of issues is the nature of the relationship
between the detention policies and national security. Each of these seven
assumptions has complicated U.S. policies and practices of detaining,
interrogating, and trying people thought to be part of a terrorist enterprise.
Each of these issues merits some further discussion, offered below.
First,is the United States in a "Global War on Terror" (GWOT) and ought
it to be? As I have argued more extensively elsewhere, the problematic concept
of a "Global War on Terror" has distorted detention and trial policies by biasing
decision-making toward military solutions.2 The traditional concept of war has
been state-centered. Two or more states put men in uniform, arm and train
them, and then deploy them on a battlefield with orders to fight to achieve
legitimate objectives. Over the centuries, two bodies of law have developed to
regulate warfare. Jus ad bellum sets the chronological and geographic
boundaries of war. It requires that wars begin and end, and it protects the rights
of neutrals. Jus in bello embodies the constraints on the conduct of war. It
limits war with a calculus that military objectives may be achieved only by
means that are necessary, proportional, and discriminate. It protects noncombatants. 22 By labeling the current situation vis-A-vis al Qaeda and its
20.

Louis HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS (1989) (arguing that in an era characterized by formal

consensus recognizing universal claims to human dignity, state practices vary too widely).
21.

Mark R. Shulman, The Four Freedoms as Good Law and Grand Strategy in an Age of

Insecurity, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 555 (2008) (arguing that the so-called "Global War on Terror" skews
national decision-and policy-making toward military solutions when a more balanced strategy would reflect
human rights and development policies as well).
22.

Traditionallyjus in bello has been called the "Law of War." Since the U.N. Charter outlawed

war, this body of law has been renamed the "Law of Armed Conflict" by war-fighters and "International
Humanitarian Law" by civilian jurists. For historical background, see MICHAEL HowARD, GEORGE J.
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affiliates as a "war," the Bush Administration appears inadvertently to have
invoked a law of war paradigm that has frequently proven itself inapt and
unhelpful. For these reasons, many people have been seeking to move away
from the term "Global War on Terror." In fact, Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates has forsaken the phrase in a post-election essay on U.S. strategy in
Foreign Affairs.23 However, because it is hard to replace something with
nothing, President Bush, among others, has argued that abandoning the Global
War on Terror (GWOT) would leave the United States and its allies with
criminal law enforcement mechanisms as the only meaningful tool for
addressing the terrorist threat. 4 In place of the GWOT, I would restore
Franklin Roosevelt's articulation of the Four Freedoms to the centerpiece of
U.S. grand strategy. They offer a short-hand for an appealing, balanced, and
principled decision-making.
Second, the real need to protect intelligence sources and methods has also
complicated detention and trial policy. Traditional distinctions between
1) war and peace;
2) foreign and U.S. persons; and
3) national intelligence and domestic criminal investigations
have led to different legal regimes protecting individuals from surveillance and
investigation. These distinctions emerged in eras characterized by strong
notions of state sovereignty. Typically, only states possessed the assets to wage
war. People were citizens or subjects to only one sovereign and the
constitutional rights of U.S. persons generally sufficed to insulate them from
invasive surveillance or investigation by banning intelligence surveillance of
them25 or by requiring police to obtain a warrant from an independent court

ANDREOPOULOS & MARK R. SHULMAN, THE LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN
WORLD (1994).
23.

Robert M. Gates, A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagonfor a New Age, 88

FOREIGN AFF. 28-29 (2009) ("What is dubbed the war on terror is, in grim reality, a prolonged, worldwide
irregular campaign-a struggle between the forces of violent extremism and those of moderation."). Id.
24.

See VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE U.S., VFWNATIONAL CONVENTION: BUSH SUMS UP

VET, WARACCOMPLISHMENTS (Aug. 20, 2008), http://www.vfw.org/index.cfm?fa=news.newsDtl&did=4681
(last visited Feb. 28, 2009) (quoting President George W. Bush "We're at war against determined enemies,

and we must not rest until that war is won. This war cannot be won, however, if we treat terrorism primarily
as a matter of law enforcement."). Id. See also IAN SHAPIRO, CONTAINMENT: REBUILDING A STRATEGY
AGAINST GLOBAL TERROR 4 (2007) (arguing for a strategy of containment because the U.S. faces real threats
that are not subsumable into a war and that "you can't beat something with nothing.").
25.

Exec. Order No. 12,333,46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 2.3(b) (1981) (Agencies within the Intelligence

Community may not undertake surveillance activities "for the purpose of acquiring information concerning

the domestic activities of United States persons.").

Shulman

2009]

before proceeding. 26 These protections guarded not only U.S. persons but also
the intelligence agencies in that they are not required to go to trial and disclose
their sources or methods in order to ensure a criminal defendant's right to
confront the evidence used against him. 27 In the GWOT, however, these three
traditional distinctions have blurred, putting strain on detention and trial
practices. Non-state actors can access weapons of mass destruction. They can
cross borders quickly and without detection, and they can abuse constitutional
protections to cause catastrophic harm. At the same time, government claims
about the need to protect sources and methods are inevitably opaque and may
potentially be offered in bad faith (for instance to protect officials from
embarrassment).28
The third major assumption remains highly contentious: the extent to
which various Bush Administration initiatives were shaped to facilitate torture
or other "enhanced interrogation techniques." Torture violates U.S. 29 and
international law.3" Senior Bush Administration officials claimed "the United
States does not torture" because its interrogation practices do not constitute
torture. 3' However, the Bush Administration has also acknowledged use of
water-boarding and other so-called "enhanced interrogation techniques" which
others conclude does indeed constitute torture.32 Presumably, the U.S.
26.
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 50 U.S.C. §§
1801-1811 (1978) (statute establishing FISA court).
27.
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (holding that,
under the Confrontation Clause, out-of-court statements by witnesses that are testimonial are barred, unless
witnesses are unavailable and defendants had prior opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, regardless of
whether such statements are deemed reliable by a court); see also Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748
(1970) (concluding that a defendant has the right to be informed of the charges against him).
28.
Br. for American Civil Liberties Union as amici curiae supporting appellees, ACLU v. Dep't
of Def., No. 06-3 140-cv, 543 F.3d 59,64 (2008) (in which plaintiffs alleged the Freedom of Information Act
requests for release of photographs of Abu Ghraib were denied not to protect national security but to protect
government officials from political or personal embarrassment). For a wise discussion of the basic problem,
see DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE (1998).
29.

18 U.S.C. §§ 113(c), 2340(1).

30.
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (the United States signed the Convention on Apr. 18, 1988
and ratified it on Oct. 21, 1994).
31.
See President Bush Speech, supranote 11. During this speech President Bush stated, "I want
to be absolutely clear with our people, and the world: The United States does not torture. It's against our
laws, and it's against our values." Id.
32.
See Interview with Vice President Richard B. Cheney, former Vice-President of the United
States, by Jonathan Karl, ABC News, availableathttp://abcnews.go.com/print?id=6464697 (last visited Feb.
28, 2009) (Vice President Cheney admitting that he believes water-boarding to be an "appropriate" method
of interrogation) and Susan Crawford's remarkable admission that the United States did torture Mohammed
al-Qahtani. Bob Woodward, Detainee Tortured,Says US. Official, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 2009, available
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/01/13/AR2009011303372
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government would be embarrassed and any criminal prosecutions would be
jeopardized if it were shown to have tortured prisoners and attempted to
introduce into open court information obtained during the course ofthat torture.
Moreover, those responsible for torture might be subject to criminal prosecution
themselves. Finally, the United States would lose even more credibility and
support from abroad if policies of torture were acknowledged. Therefore, the
government may have numerous motivations to avoid releasing information that
would expose evidence of torture. These incentives conflict with the government's interest in using all available tools to obtain conviction of individuals
suspected of plotting or committing terrorist acts.
The fourth assumption shaping the climate for interrogating and trying
accused terrorists is the fact that the U.S. Government has detained some people
who do not pose and have not posed a threat to American interests.33 Some are
innocent of crimes or criminal intentions but were detained because of an
honest mistake, because of sloppy procedures, or because a third-party
intentionally misled U.S. forces into accepting custody of them. Without being
able to determine who among them is innocent, the government jeopardizes
national security by releasing them. Others intend no harm to the United States
but do plausibly pose a danger to other countries if released. This complex
situation-along with the arduous and perhaps impossible task of sorting them
out accurately-has further complicated the United States' position. On the
other hand, and to paraphrase Oliver Wendell Holmes, hard cases should not
be permitted to make bad law. The new Obama Administration has the
opportunity to develop policies that will produce individualized determinations
of innocence and guilt without being bound by imprudent Bush precedent.
The fifth assumption is that there are some people who intend to harm U.S.
national security but who have not committed any acts that would result in a
criminal conviction. The government has alleged that certain people have
.html?hpid-topnews (last visited Feb. 28, 2009) (convening authority of the military commissions stating
"His treatment met the legal definition of torture. And that's why I did not refer the case' for prosecution.");
see also David Stout, Holder Tells Senator Waterboardingis Torture,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16,2009, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/us/politics/16holdercnd.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2009), for the
testimony of Eric Holder before Senate Judiciary Committee on January 14, 2009 and for a scholarly
evaluation of water-boarding. See Evan Wallach, Drop By Drop: Forgetting The History Of Water Torture
In US. Courts, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 468 (2007) (arguing that water-boarding is torture as defined
by U.S. courts).
33.

For a useful survey, see MARK DENBEAUX ET AL., PROFILE OF RELEASE GUANTANAMO

PRISONERS: THE GOVERNMENT'S STORY THEN AND Now (2008), available at http://Aaw.shu.edu/center_

policyresearch/reports/detainees then and now final.pdf(last visited Feb.28,2009). TheNewYorkTimes
has compiled another useful index of prisoners in The Guanthnamo Docket, The Detainees, N.Y. TIMES,
available at http://projects.nytimes.com/Guantanamo (last visited Feb. 28, 2009). For one of the most
controversial examples, see In re Guantinamo Bay Detainee Litigation, 2008 WL 4725712 (D.D.C. Oct. 24,
2008) (17 Chinese national Uighurs were ordered to be released by Judge Richard Urbina).
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expressed dangerous intentions but cannot be charged with crimes, either
because doing so would compromise sources and methods or because they have
not had the opportunity yet to attack American interests. Once again,
developing a factual account of these individuals and their intentions is
complicated both by the need to protect intelligence resources and by the fact
that the crimes are at most inchoate. The assumption that some people would
harm the United States if set free, gave rise to proposals for the establishment
of civil or "administrative" detention schemes such as that proposed by panelist
Matthew Waxman.3 4 On the other hand, prosecutions for inchoate crimes or
even use of the material witness statute may obviate the need for such a radical
new system. After all, federal prosecutors have had notable success over the
years prosecuting individuals for other crimes (such as money laundering or
fraud) or criminal conspiracy. It may well be that zealous U.S. attorneys could
obtain convictions of the guilty. Because the Bush Administration so often
avoided presenting their arguments and evidence before the Article III courts,
we do not know how professional prosecutors would fare. Once again, this
factual indeterminacy leaves open a variety of policy choices. At this point the
decision to prosecute should remain within the discretion of the prosecutor
(working as appropriate with the law enforcement and intelligence
communities) while the need for a new preventive detention scheme remains
unproven and would overturn the fundamental constitutional principle that an
individual is innocent before the law until proven guilty.
The sixth element running throughout the discourse is a palpable distrust
of the Executive and particularly of the Bush Administration. The distrust falls
into several categories. There is a long-standing general distrust of the
Executive held by some human rights and libertarian groups (and a small
number of partisans of the Legislative branch). Their suspicions have
inevitably been amplified by the muscular interpretation of executive authority
exercised by the Bush Administration since the autumn of 2001, as well as by
its particular brand of secretiveness. They were further amplified for some who

34.
See Matthew C. Waxman, YPERLINK"http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/
2008/0724_detention waxman/0724_detentionwaxman.pdf"AdministrativeDetention:The Integrationof
Strategy and Legal Process, (The Brookings Institute, Working Paper, July 24, 2008), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/0724_detentionwaxman/0724_detentionwaxm
an.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2009) (addressing the question "in combating terrorism, why administratively
detain, and detain whom?"); John Farmer, A Terror Threat in the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2008 (former
U.S. Attorney favoring a preventive detention scheme to clarify rules and prevent attacks); Jack L. Goldsmith
& Neal Katyal, The Terrorists' Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2007 (one conservative and one liberal law
professor jointly proposing that specialized Article MIjudges administer a preventive detention system that
Congress would define); BENJAMIN WrrrEs, LAW AND THE LONG WAR: THE FUTURE OF JUSTICE INTHE AGE
OF TERROR (2008) 15 1. For more of this discussion, see my review essay assessing the Wittes book
forthcoming in the American Journal of International Law.
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had concluded that some of the secretiveness was intended to obscure laziness,
incompetence, or venality rather than such legitimate governmental interests as
intelligence sources and methods, or the need to act quickly or without
attribution. By late 2008, the distrust had expanded even further, perhaps
because of the perceived lack of democratic legitimacy of an administration that
appears to have been rebuked in the national election. Presumably, much of
this distrust will be allayed by the Obama Administration, giving the
government some new space in which to devise solutions.
The seventh and most complicated set of issues arises out of the complex
relationship between the Bush Administration's detention policies and actual
national security. The Bush Administration consistently claimed that its
policies were correctly designed and properly implemented in order to ensure
security. Those detained were the worst of the worst, and their detention was
both essential and effective. Conditions were appropriate. Methods of interrogation were both lawful and necessary. Any exceptions were aberrations
attributable to a few bad apples. On the other hand, critics argued that the
detentions and interrogations were in great part unlawful and that they
undermined national security by inflaming tensions and alienating the United
States in the world court of public opinion. Most experts who are not currently
serving in the Bush Administration conclude that torture does not produce
useful information. And while the federal courts have resolved many of the
legal questions3 5 (at least for now), the security question may ultimately prove
impossible to resolve. Justice Stewart's view that public opinion plays a critical
role in assessing the legality of national security measures36 can be extended to
drawing conclusions about their effectiveness. Indeed, their effectiveness reinforces assessments oftheir legitimacy. However, Justice Stewart's concurrence
addressed the relatively specific question of prior censorship and writing in
1971; he could not reasonably take into account only the opinion of the
American public. 3' Today, the United States depends on global good will that
in turn rests on its reputation for fairness. To the extent the United States is
viewed as responsible for torture and other serious insults inflicted at Abu
Ghraib and Guantdnamo, it is alienating people and possibly fostering
terrorism. 3 If this political/strategic conclusion is correct, then the question of
35.
See Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 426 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507
(2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (2008). The
literature examining these cases is vast and beyond the scope of this article.
36.

New York Times Co., 403 U.S. 713.

37.

Id.at 832-33.

38.
See Exec. Sum., Senate Armed Services Committee InquiryInto The Treatment OfDetainees
In U.S. Custody,(Dec. 11,2008), availableat, http://evin.senate.gov/newsroom/supporting/2008/Detainees.
121108.pdf(last visited Feb. 28, 2009) (citing former Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora's testimony that
"there are serving U.S. flag-rank officers who maintain that the first and second identifiable causes of U.S.
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whether to create national security courts should be approached with great
caution. If they appear unfair-ad hoc, less lawful, discriminatory, or
hypocritical-they may diminish America's soft power.
III. Do WE NEED NATIONAL SECURITY COURTS?
Buffeted by the powerful forces described above and frustrated by the
nation's inability to find a one-stop shop for administering detentions and trials,
some learned commentators have proposed the establishment of special purpose
national security courts. These proposals suggest that such a system offers
benefits in expediency and efficiency and enhanced security for the trial and for
its participants and the community in which it is held. They also say that
national security courts offer a sensible way of managing the high stakes of
releasing someone who should not have been. This might be a person who
turns out to be dangerous or someone who would not have been dangerous if
left alone but who has become radicalized as a byproduct of U.S. detention or
treatment. Such a system also answers an unstated (but misguided) implication
that a regularly established judicial system would not be harsh enough, i.e., the
interrogation and trial ought themselves to be punishing. Finally, they propose
that a national security court system could administer a system that would
address the possibility that some of the detainees are only guilty of holding a
status or aspiration not of any act for which one could be convicted within the
existing legal system.
The most notable proposal came in the summer of 2007 shortly before its
author was nominated to serve as Attorney General of the United States. In a
widely cited op-ed piece in the Wall Street Journal,Michael Mukasey called
on Congress to consider establishing special terror courts.39 Mukasey did not
propose anything that had not been suggested by others previously, but several
factors made his proposal particularly notable. First, he was among the few
people with directly relevant personal experience; as a one-time federal district
court judge, Mukasey had presided over the trials and conviction of Omar
Abdel Rahman and the first trial Jos6 Padilla.4" Mukasey had first-hand
experience with terrorist trials and could attest to their challenges. Second, he
received his nomination shortly after publishing the high-profile op-ed piece,
giving rise to speculation that the Bush Administration was endorsing the model
of terror courts. Third, as Attorney General, Mukasey would have the capacity
(perhaps even the obligation) to pursue this concept. And finally, as a smart
combat deaths in Iraq-as judged by their effectiveness in recruiting insurgent fighters into combat-are,
respectively the symbols of Abu Ghraib and Guantinamo."). Id.
39.

Michael B. Mukasey, Josi Padilla Makes Bad Law, WALL ST.J., Aug. 22, 2007, at Al5.

40.
United States v. Rahman, 854 F. Supp. 254 (S.D.N.Y. 1994); Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d
564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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and experienced lawyer, Mukasey makes a facially appealing argument. He
argued that the U.S. record for trying accused terrorists is poor; too few trials
were undertaken at too great a cost. They strained financial and security
resources, jeopardized intelligence sources and methods, and may have forced
unintended consequences such as relaxing procedural due process standards in
ordinary criminal trials or pushing interrogation overseas to less "squeamish"
jurisdictions.4 While the Mukasey op-ed piece contained few details, it did cite
favorably to more extended treatments produced by Andrew C. McCarthy and
Alykhan Velshi of the Center for Law & Counterterrorism 2 and by former
Deputy Attorney General George J. Terwilliger.43
The concept of a national security court has received support from a
number of commentators, most, but not all of them, political conservatives. In
addition to those produced by Terwilliger, McCarthy, and Velshi, the National
Review's Stuart Taylor published the "Case for a National Security Court" in
The Atlantic.' Amos Guiora and John Parry published "Light at the End of the
Pipeline?: Choosing a Forum for Suspected Terrorists" in the University of
PennsylvaniaLaw Review.45 Also of note, former head of President George W.
Bush's Office of Legal Counsel Jack Goldsmith teamed up with Salim
Hamdan's Supreme Court lawyer Neil Katyal to write aNew York Times op-ed,
' More recently, panelist Glenn Sulmasy completed
"The Terrorists' Court."46
the first major book-length treatment of this topic in his forthcoming The
NationalSecurity CourtSystem: a Natural Evolution of Justice in an Age of
Terror.4 7 All these proposals would establish a court to administer the trial of
41.

Mukasey, supra note 39.

42.
Andrew McCarthy & Alykhan Velshi, The Foundation for Defense of Democracies' Center for
Law & Counterterrorism, We Need a National Security Court (2006), http://www.
defenddemocracy.org/images/stories/national%20security/ 20court.pdf; Mukasey, supra note 39.
43.
George J. Terwilliger, Center for Law and Counterterrorism Symposium at the National Press
Club on the "Lawfare" Debate (Jan. 24, 2007) (Panel event: Panel I-Is It a War? Legal Ramifications);
Mukasey, supra note 39.
44.
Stuart Taylor, Jr., The Case for a National Security Court, THE ATLANTIC, Feb. 27, 2007,
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200702u/njtaylor_2007-02-27 (last visited Jan. 29, 2009).
45.
Amos N. Guiora & John T. Parry, Light at the End of the Pipeline?: Choosing a Forumfor
Suspected Terrorists, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 356 (Feb. 2008).
46.
Goldsmith & Katyal, supra note 34. Katyal represented Harmdan before the Supreme Court in
Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (finding that the structures and procedures of the existing military commissions
violate the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Common Article Ill of the Geneva Conventions). In
response, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006 which created another form of military
commission that subsequently convicted Hamdan for providing material support for terrorism. Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (Oct. 17, 2006). Hamdan was sentenced to
time served plus six months and was transferred to his native Yemen where he served out the remainder of
his term. Katyal is now the Principal Deputy Solicitor General.
47.

Sulmasy 2009, supranote 3. While I have not seen the book, I have read various shorter pieces
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terrorist subjects. Some also recommend that such a court administer a
preventive detention scheme.48
Opposition to the creation of national security courts has in many ways
mirrored the movement in favor of establishing them. Many of the arguments
have appeared in human rights organization-sponsored reports 9 and newspaper
op-ed pieces,5" and the voices are mostly liberal. However, that last fact did not
stop John C. Coughenour, a Reagan appointee on the federal bench in Seattle,
from opining that "American courts, guided by the principles of our
Constitution, are fully capable of trying suspected terrorists."'" Much like
Mukasey, Judge Coughenour based his conclusions in great part on his personal
experience; he had overseen the trial and conviction of an Algerian national,
Ahmed Ressam, the so-called "millennium bomber." 2 Coughenour also
observed that the perceived fairness of regular district courts offers a strategic
benefit as well. "For two years after his conviction [and sentencing to twentytwo years], thanks in part to the fairness he was shown by the court, Mr.
Ressam provided useful intelligence to terrorism investigations around the
world as German, Italian, French, and British authorities were willing to

by Professor Sulmasy and heard him present the topics on several occasions. I have also enjoyed a number
of conversations with him addressing elements of the proposal.
See Wittes, supra note 34; Goldsmith & Katyal, supranote 34; see also Waxman, supra note
48.
34. For a brief and sensible survey of the content of the various proposals to date, see Stephen I. Vladeck,
The Case Against National Security Courts, 45 WILLAMETrE L. REv. (forthcoming 2009), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-l 315337 (last visited Feb. 10, 2009).
See, e.g., Zabel & Benjamin, supra note 2; A CRITIQUE OF "NATIONAL SECURrIY COURTS," THE
49.
CONSTITUTIONPROJECT(2008), http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/Critiqueof theNationalSecurity
_Courts.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
See, e.g., Kelly Anne Moore, Take Al-Qaeda to Court, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2007; David
50.
Laufinan, Terror Trials Work: Yes, Mr. Mukasey, Courts Can Handle NationalSecurity Cases, LEGAL
TIMES, Nov. 5,2007; Mark R. Shulman, Prosecutor'sLegacy is One to Consider,ALB. TIMES UNION, May
23, 2008, at Al1.
See John C. Coughenour, How to Try a Terrorist,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2007. Accord Hon.
51.
Leonie Brinkema, U.S. Dist. Court for the E. Dist. of V.A. Judge, Keynote Address at the Washington College
of Law at American University Symposium: Terrorists and Detainees: Do We Need a New National Security
Court? (Feb. 1,2008), httpJ/www.wcl.american.edu/podcast/podcast.cfin?uri=http%3 A//www.wcl.american.
edu/podcast/audio/20080201 WCL TAD.mp3 (last visited Jan. 23, 2009). The judge who oversaw the trial
of Zacarias Moussaoui concluding that the existing federal district courts are absolutely capable of trying
those accused of terrorist acts; "the system does in fact work." Id. Judge Brinkema also presided over the trial
in which lyman Faris was found guilty of having provided material support for al-Qaeda in his plot to destroy
the Brooklyn Bridge.
52.
In 2005, Ressam was convicted of plotting to bomb Los Angeles International Airport on New
Year's Eve, December 31, 1999. Ressam's post-sentencing history is long and fascinating; in the end it
appears that Judge Coughenour's decisions stand. See Associated Press, JudgeAffirms 'MillenniumBomber'
Sentence, MSNBC, Dec. 3, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28028799/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
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attest."53 For purposes of evaluating arguments based mostly on one judge's
first-hand observations, Coughenour's op-ed appears to meet and cancel out
that of Mukasey.
One major report collected the informed perspectives of a far larger
sample set than the one or two experienced by Judges Mukasey and
Coughenour. Former Assistant U.S. Attorneys James Benjamin and panelist
Richard Zabel headed up a team of investigators at their law firm (Akin Gump)
to research the experience of ordinary terrorist trials. The Akin Gump team
worked closely with the professional staff at Human Rights First (led by
panelist Gabor Rona) to develop the thoroughly researched In Pursuit of
Justice: ProsecutingTerrorismCases in the FederalCourts.4 The premise of
this White Paper is that special purpose national security courts should be
established only if the extant and time-tested system of Article III courts is
shown to be inadequate to the task. In this effort, the Akin Gump team pored
over the "docket sheets, motion papers . . . judicial opinions [and] ... press
accounts" and interviewed prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges with
"firsthand [terrorism litigation] experience" in the 123 federal criminal cases
involving Islamist terrorism.55 Zabel and Benjamin concluded that:
The criminal justice system is reasonably well equipped to handle
most international terrorism cases. Specifically, prosecuting terrorism
defendants in the court system appears as a general matter to lead to
just, reliable results and not to cause serious security breaches or
other problems that threaten the nation's security. Of course,
challenges arise from time to time--sometimes serious ones-but
most of these challenges are not unique to international terrorism
cases.

56

They go on to note frankly what they could not discern, in particular,
information about cases that were not brought for one reason or another.57
Indeed, such instances have been darkly alluded to by other experienced
prosecutors and government officials although never in sufficient detail for a
non-participant to evaluate the claims.58
53.
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54.

Zabel & Benjamin, supra note 2.

55.

Id. at 1, 5.
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Id. at 2.

57.

See generallyid.

58.
See an earlier panel discussion that I chaired at the Association of the Bar of the City of New
York. Mary Jo White, former U.S. Attorney for the Southern Dist. of N.Y., Prosecuting Terrorists: The
Prosecutors'
Perspectives-a Panel Discussion (Sept. 8, 2008), available at
http'//www.abcny.org/Committees/Pocasts-l.htm (ast visited Feb. 28, 2009); seealso Andrew C. McCarthy,
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Another important set of perspectives about special-purpose terror courts
can be gained by reviewing the experience of other countries. The foreign
experiences with such courts offer considerable insights into their strengths and
weaknesses. Based on my understanding of these histories, I would tentatively
conclude that these institutions have neither enhanced national security nor
insulated ordinary domestic legal systems against the lowering of judicial
standards for transparency, impartiality, and fundamental fairness to the
accused.
National security or terrorist courts in other countries offer troubling
lessons, mostly because of their implications for the respect for civil liberties
generally-not only of the accused, but of the wider population. Existing
proposals to create such a court in the United States inadequately account for
this risk, or explain how it would be minimized or mitigated. Emergency
systems in other countries have invariably reduced civil liberties for the general
population. It is understandable that governments wish to be seen to be
responding to the urgent threats posed by those who use violence to affect
policy. However, it is important to recognize that these emergency systems in
such diverse jurisdictions as Great Britain, Malaysia, and South Africa have
diminished freedoms for society as a whole.
This principle lesson derived of foreign experiences is not particularly
surprising. Examples abound of domestic emergency measures taken to
promote national security that have undermined the base norm presumption of
innocence that lies at the center of America's constitutional order. The largescale internment ofJapanese-Americans during the Second World War provides
a notorious example.59 In that case, the federal courts deferred to the
Executive's misguided policy and thereby created a new and heinous rule
allowing for internment, displacement, and forced sales of property based on
no more than the notion that citizens of a given race might seek to harm the
United States. 60 Although the United States has officially apologized for this
shameful episode, Korematsu has not been overruled in the two generations
since the Supreme Court handed down its 6-3 decision. 6' The Korematsu
precedent may have given some legal cover for the large scale detention of
Americans of Moslem, Arab, or Middle-Eastern background in the months
following September 1 1.6 These discriminatory policies undermine the soft
former Assistant U.S. Attorney, Prosecuting Terrorists: The Prosecutors' Perspectives-a Panel Discussion
(Sept. 8, 2008), available at http://www.abcny.org/Committees/PocastsI.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2009).
59.

For a survey of this shameful episode, see DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE
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60.
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61.
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62.
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power America otherwise derives from its role as a leader in promoting respect
for human rights.
In other countries, emergency powers have had a similarly deleterious
effect on civil liberties. In the United Kingdom, in order to address violence
originating in troubled Northern Ireland, the government revoked the right to
trial by jury for criminal offenses; denied access to legal counsel; held prisoners
without charge; and allowed coercive interrogation techniques and admitted
confessions elicited because of them, among other measures.63 In Malaysia, the
government transferred judges from their positions to avoid judicial review of
its decisions or release of suspects arrested without even probable cause-in
violation of well-established constitutional law.' In apartheid South Africa,
judicial review was revoked for interrogation purposes. These extra-judicial
detentions lasted weeks. In addition to radical nationalists, they swept up completely harmless nuns and pastors urging more widespread equality and access
to education. 65 Three cases, of course, do not constitute a comprehensive
survey or prove the point. Even the Akin Gump survey of 123 domestic cases
can lead only to limited conclusions. However, these three examples do offer
insights into the threats to liberty posed by special purpose terrorism courts.
IV. Quo VADIS?
Would a system of national security courts offer the kind of specialized
justice necessary for addressing the threat posed by radical Islamists or others
who seek to use terrorist means? Or, in a tragic parallel to the Stuart kings'
infamous Star Chamber, would these courts ultimately undermine the nation's
security by degrading both its legal system and the soft power derived from its
cherished reputation as a model for justice? On the eve of the inauguration of
Barack Obama, these critical questions remain unresolved in the court of
"public opinion which alone can here protect the values of democratic
government."66

See also The Indefinite Detention of "Enemy Combatants ": BalancingDue Process and National Security
in the Context of the War on Terror, (Feb. 6, 2004, rev'd Mar. 18, 2004) reprinted in THE IMPERIAL
PRESIDENCY, supra note 16, at 91, 122.
63.
See Michael P. O'Connor & Celia M. Runann, Into the Fire: How to Avoid Getting Burned
by the Same Mistakes Made FightingTerrorism in Northern Ireland, 24 CARDOZO L. REV 1657, 1665-87
(2003); Fionnuala Ni AolAin, The Fortificationof an Emergency Regime, 59 ALB. L. REv 1353, 1373, 78
(1996).
64.
See Nicole Fritz & Martin Flaherty, Unjust Order: Malaysia's Internal Security Act, 26
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1345, 1412 (2002-03).
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See Lennox S.Hinds, The Gross Violations of Human Rights of the ApartheidRegime Under
InternationalLaw, I RUTGERS RACE & L. REv 231, 271 (1999).
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Over the seven years of trial and error, the Supreme Court and Congress
have tackled many of the issues raised by the Bush Administration's programs
for detaining, interrogating, and trying those alleged to be guilty of terrorism.
But the willingness of Congress to take the back seat and the Court's
parsimonious approach to interpreting rights in the context of national security
has left unresolved many critical issues.67 As a result, Barack Obama inherits
approximately 240 detainees at Guantinamo along with the constraints that
have developed-or been reconstituted-over the past several years.6 8 Many
of these people have been severely mistreated, leaving them injured, broken,
embittered, and possibly incapable of being tried in a properly constituted court
of law. Their mistreatment has alienated American allies and untold individuals
on whose sympathies the nation might otherwise have relied. At the same time,
no one has provided conclusive evidence that the existing legal systems are
inadequate for trying those accused of terrorism. And while Congress, the
courts, and the court of public opinion have not yet seriously begun to deal with
the questions surrounding preventive detention of people not yet captured, little
evidence has been produced to show that existing systems do not or cannot
suffice. Despite the clear mandate for "change," change in this instance may
lie at the root of these problems. Based on the experience discussed above, I
conclude that the United States would be better served by a return to normalcy:
restoring time-tested assumptions of innocence until proven guilty, of freedom
over detention, and the resort to war only as a last resort and constrained as to
time, place, and means.69
67.

Owen Fiss, The Perils of Minimalism, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 643 (July 2008)

("minimalism has led to legislative enactments that deprive the prisoners of basic rights and that, as a
practical matter, compromise the capacity of the Supreme Court ever to adequately address the prisoners'
claims."). Id. See also Wittes, supra note 34, ch. 2.
68.
See Benjamin Wittes et al., The CurrentDetaineePopulation of Guantinamo:An Empirical
Study, BROOKINGS, December 16, 2008, available at http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/1216_
detainees wittes.aspx (last visited Mar. 29, 2009).
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Numerous human rights groups have offered detailed suggestions to the Obama transition team.
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